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PREVIEW; State v. Barrows: Double Jeopardy in Multi-Count
Criminal Proceedings.
Caitlin Creighton
Oral arguments are scheduled for Wednesday, June 27,
2018, at 9:30 a.m. in the Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court,
Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building, in Helena, Montana. Assistant
Appellate Defender Alexander H. Pyle is expected to argue on
behalf of Appellant Barrows and Assistant Attorney General
Tammy A. Hinderman is expected to argue on behalf of Appellee
State of Montana.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The sole issue before the Court is whether the district court
violated Barrows’ constitutional double jeopardy protections under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution and Article II, § 25 of the Montana Constitution. The
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution and
Montana Constitution declare that no person shall be put in jeopardy
for the same offense twice.1
In 2016, Barrows was convicted of three counts of assault
with a weapon and two counts of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. At trial, the district court sua sponte dismissed one of the drug
possession charges. Despite the dismissal, the district court later
instructed the jury on the dismissed drug charge, and Barrows was
convicted.
Barrows appealed, providing the Court an excellent
opportunity to clarify when the Double Jeopardy Clause is triggered.
Specifically, the Court can resolve whether the Double Jeopardy
Clause is triggered upon the dismissal of a single charge or upon the
dismissal of an entire multi-count proceeding.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Barrows was pulled over after authorities received a report
that he pointed a gun at another driver.2 After a legitimate search of
Barrows’ vehicle, an officer seized a BB gun, baggies of
methamphetamine, and baggies of prescription pills identified by
the officer as Lorazepam.3 Barrows was arrested and charged with
three counts of assault with a weapon, one count of possession of
1

U.S. CONST. amend. V; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 25.
Appellee’s Response Brief at 3, State v. Barrows,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/2/369/url/321Z246_03WCCVM23003NSV.pdf
(Mont. Mar. 22, 2018) (No. DA 17-0061).
3 Id. at 4–5.
2
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methamphetamine and one count of possession of Lorazepam.4
At trial, the Nineteenth Judicial District Court of Lincoln
County determined that the State failed to provide sufficient
evidence of Lorazepam possession during its case-in-chief.5 The
investigating officer identified the pills by typing the number printed
on the pills into Drugs.com; believing this research was sufficient
for identification purposes, the prescription pills were never sent to
the State Crime Lab for testing.6 Consequently, the district court
dismissed the charge midtrial, telling Barrows, “You are not going
to be convicted of Lorazepam possession because I am not going to
give that charge . . . I will dismiss the Lorazepam case. The
Lorazepam charge is off.”7
Following the sua sponte dismissal of the Lorazepam
charge, Barrows testified.8 During his testimony, Barrows admitted
not only to being in possession of prescription pills at the time of his
arrest, but knowing the pills were Lorazepam.9 When it came time
to decide jury instructions, the State proposed instructions relating
to the dismissed Lorazepam charge.10 Without objection, the district
court read jury instructions on the definition of Lorazepam and the
required elements of Lorazepam possession.11 The jury convicted
Barrows for all three counts of assault with a weapon and both
counts of drug possession.12
III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Barrows brings several claims on appeal; however, the Court
limited oral argument to a single issue: whether the district court
violated constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy when it
convicted Barrows’ of possession of Lorazepam.13 The parties’
primary dispute is with the interpretation of Mont. Code Ann. §46–
16–403, which reads:
When, at the close of the prosecution's evidence or at the
close of all the evidence, the evidence is insufficient to
support a finding or verdict of guilty, the court may, on
its own motion or on the motion of the defendant,
dismiss the action and discharge the defendant.
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 3–4, State v. Barrows,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/1/368/url/321Z246_03W910E6F005XJQ.pdf
(Mont. Nov. 20, 2017) (No. DA 17-0061).
5 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 1.
6 Id. at 4.
7 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 4.
8 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 6.
9 Id. at 6–7.
10 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 5.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Oral Argument Schedule, COURTS.MT.GOV, https://courts.mt.gov/courts/supreme/oral_arguments
(last visited June 3, 2018).
4
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However, prior to dismissal, the court may allow the
case to be reopened for good cause shown (emphasis
added).14
The parties disagree about how the words “action” and
“case” are defined within the statute’s context.15 Barrows argues
these terms refer to a single charge, whereas the State argues these
terms refer to an entire multi-count proceeding.16 The focus of the
oral argument will likely be clarifying when double jeopardy is
triggered: the moment the court dismisses a single charge during the
multi-count proceeding or only once the entire proceeding has
reached conclusion.
A.

Defendant-Appellant Barrows’ Argument

Barrows argues his post-dismissal conviction for possession
of Lorazepam directly violates the holding and policy in Smith v.
Massachusetts.17 Barrows argues that he, like Smith, was convicted
of a charge previously dismissed in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.18 The United States Supreme Court’s holding in Smith
established that, even if a defendant introduces incriminating
evidence after a midtrial dismissal, the dismissal must be treated as
final unless there is a pre-existing rule allowing reconsideration.19
Barrows asserts his conviction was everything the Smith Court
wanted to prevent: influencing a defendant to testify candidly after
a midtrial dismissal, re-jeopardizing the defendant if the charge
reappears.20
Additionally, Barrows highlights that Montana does not
have a pre-existing rule establishing the availability of
reconsideration.21 Barrows argues that § 46–16–403 does not allow
reconsideration after a case is unequivocally dismissed, as the State
contends.22 Barrows interprets the word “case” to mean a single
charge in a multi-count proceeding.23 Essentially, Barrows
interprets the statute to mean that, once a court has dismissed a
single charge, the charge may not be reopened, regardless of
whether additional charges remain in the proceeding.24
Barrows maintains that his conviction for possession of
14

Mont. Code Ann. § 46–16–403 (2017).
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 12–14; Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at
17.
16 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 12–14; Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at
17.
17 543 U.S. 462 (2005); Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 10.
18 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 11.
19 Id.; Smith, 543 U.S. at 473.
20 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 11–13.
21 Id. at 12; Mont. Code Ann. § 46–16–403.
22 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 13.
23 Id.
24 Id.
15
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Lorazepam violates §46–16–403 because the district court
unequivocally dismissed the possession of Lorazepam charge.25 As
such, the constitutional protections from double jeopardy effectively
prevent the “case” from being reopened.26
B.

Plaintiff-Appellee State of Montana’s Response

The State argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause is not
violated when a court reconsiders a previously dismissed charge;
however, the State concedes this is true only when there is a preexisting rule allowing reconsideration and additional charges in the
proceeding remain.27 The State maintains that because only one of
Barrows’ five charges was dismissed midtrial, the Double Jeopardy
Clause was not triggered.28
The State opposes Barrows’ interpretation of § 46–16–403,
arguing that this statute authorizes reconsideration of a dismissed
charge.29 Specifically, the State interprets the words “action” and
“case” to mean an entire multi-count proceeding.30 The State argues
that the plain language of the statute indicates that, unless a court
has dismissed the entire multi-count proceeding, a court remains
able to reconsider a charge after a midtrial dismissal.31
The State maintains that the legislative intent behind § 46–
16–403 was not to discharge a defendant from custody unless all of
their charges were dismissed.32 The State argues that if “action”
means a single charge, then under the statute, a defendant would be
discharged from custody after dismissal of a single charge.33
Because Barrows’ entire proceeding was not dismissed midtrial and
the district court had the ability to reconsider the charge, the State
contends the dismissal of the possession of Lorazepam charge was
not final and the Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated.34
C.

Defendant-Appellant Barrows Reply

Barrows reasserts his interpretation of § 46–16–403, arguing
that neither the statute nor Montana case law permit the revival of a
previously dismissed charge.35 He further claims that “action” and
25

Id.
Id.
27 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 22–23.
28 Id.; Smith, 543 U.S. at 473.
29 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 16.
30 Id. at 25; see State v. Forsythe, 390 P.3d 931 (2017).
31 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2,. at 24.
32 Id. at 25–26.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 25.
35 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3, State v. Barrows,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/1/368/url/321Z253_04JVJC3P90000T9.pdf
(Mont. May 2, 2018) (No. DA 17-0061).
26
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“case” within the context of the statute cannot translate to mean an
entire multi-count proceeding, although these words may refer to an
entire proceeding in other contexts.36
Barrows disagrees with the State’s logic; specifically, he
maintains that the State’s interpretation of the statute would suggest
that courts can only dismiss an entire proceeding midtrial, not a
single charge.37 Simply put, because the statute indicates, “[T]he
court may, on its own motion . . . dismiss the action and discharge
the defendant,” and the State interprets “action” to mean an entire
proceeding, it does not follow that this statute permits courts to
dismiss a single charge.38 Yet, Barrows contends Montana case law
clearly establishes that § 46–16–403 allows for the dismissal of a
single charge.39 Barrows persists the State’s interpretation of the
statute is incorrect and does not authorize his conviction for
possession of Lorazepam.40
IV.

Analysis

The issue in this case is one of first impression for the Court.
Although the Court has determined that a midtrial dismissal of a
single charge is permissible, it has not yet discussed the validity of
a double jeopardy claim after a defendant has been convicted for a
dismissed charge in a multi-count proceeding.41
The Court will likely agree with Barrows’ interpretation of
§ 46–16–403. Montana’s double jeopardy jurisprudence focuses on
whether a defendant has previously been put in jeopardy for an
offense “equivalent to the offense with which Montana now charges
him.”42 Therefore, the Court will likely determine Barrows was
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense because he was tried for
an identical charge twice. The State failed to provide sufficient
evidence of Defendant’s possession of Lorazepam; yet, he was
retried and convicted for this offense after the district court
explicitly dismissed the charge midtrial.
In Smith, the Court explained: “[I]f the prosecution has not
yet obtained a conviction, further proceedings to secure one are
impermissible . . . subjecting the defendant to post-acquittal fact
finding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double
Jeopardy Clause.”43 The Court will look to Smith for authority in
this case and will likely determine that Barrows’ conviction for
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 35, at 6–7.
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 35, at 5–6.
38 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 35, at 6.
39 Id.; see State v. Gregori, 328 P.3d 1128 (2014); see State v. Hegg, 956 P.2d 754 (1998).
40 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 35, at 8.
41 Id. at 6.
42 State v. Kline, 305 P.3d 55, 58 (2013).
43 Smith, 543 U.S. at 466 (citing Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986)).
36
37
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possession of Lorazepam was impermissible because his admission
to possession of Lorazepam went directly to his guilt or innocence
on that charge.
Each parties’ interpretation of the statute has merit; however,
Barrows will likely have the controlling argument. The State makes
a strong argument that “action” and “case” refer to an entire
proceeding based on the legislature’s reference to discharging the
defendant upon dismissal of the action. The State’s argument that
“discharging the defendant” refers to discharging them from an
entire proceeding, not necessarily a single charge, is also persuasive.
However, this argument ultimately will not convince the Court
because Montana precedent clearly establishes that courts may
dismiss single charges midtrial sua sponte.
That being said, Barrows was clearly put in jeopardy twice
for the same offense. The Court’s holding in State v. Cline44
effectively established that the double jeopardy protections are
triggered when a defendant is put in jeopardy for two equivalent
charges. The district court unequivocally stated that the “Lorazepam
charge was off”45 and established that the State failed to provide
evidence sufficient for the charge. Consequently, Barrows was tried
for an offense that the district court had already dismissed—a direct
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
V.

Summary

The parties’ contrary interpretations of § 46–16–403 provide
the Court a great opportunity to clarify when double jeopardy
protections are triggered. If the Court adopts the State’s statutory
interpretation, Montana defendants may be tried for the same
offense twice when their charge is dismissed and they are
subsequently tried again for the same charge. Adopting Barrows’
argument, however, would ensure that defendants are not convicted
if they candidly testify after a midtrial dismissal. If the State does
not meet its burden but can nonetheless still try defendants for a
charge post-dismissal, the integrity of the Double Jeopardy Clause
is threatened. In sum, the Court must find § 46–16–403 does not
authorize post-dismissal convictions. The Court’s decision in this
case has the potential to safeguard the constitutional protection
defendants have under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

44
45

Id.
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 4.

